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Abstract
General Aviation (GA) safety is influenced and affected by choices pilots make with respect to their instrument proficiency and
currency. Quantitative research on the instrument proficiency issues indicates a correlation between recent instrument experience and pilot
skill. However, there is very little qualitative research on the subject. Qualitative research contributes to understanding the underlying
issues and themes that contribute to loss of control accidents while operating in instrument meteorological conditions. This qualitative
case study explores factors involving pilot instrument proficiency in a general aviation loss of control accident. These factors include pilot
logbook irregularities, checklist usage, aircraft systems knowledge, pilot training, and pilot proficiency.
Keywords: instrument proficiency, loss of control, autopilot, general aviation, weather-related loss of control, pilot instrument proficiency, checklist,
checklist usage

Introduction
Almost one half of all General Aviation (GA) fatal accidents are the result of loss of control (General Aviation Joint
Steering Committee, 2012). Approximately 14% of the loss of control accidents occur to instrument-rated pilots flying in
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) (Fanjoy & Keller, 2013; General Aviation Joint Steering Committee, 2012).
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These accidents have resulted in hundreds of fatalities over
the last decade. Investigations reveal that some of these
pilots do not meet instrument currency requirements to
legally act as pilot in command while operating under
instrument flight rules, others may have little to no recent
actual instrument experience, and some have been advised
to not fly under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR).
Literature Review
There have been a number of studies conducted over the
last fifty years researching the issues related to pilot
instrument currency, instrument proficiency, and weatherrelated accidents. Several studies largely focused on pilot
instrument flying skills (Mengelkoch, Adams, & Gainer,
1971; Wright, 1973; Casner, Geven, Recker, & Schooler,
2014). Some concentrated on Part 121 air carrier pilots and
the erosion of instrument hand-flying skills (Mitchell,
Vermeulen, & Naidoo, 2009; Casner, Geven, Recker, &
Schooler, 2014). Two quantitative studies measured pilot
deviations from heading, altitude, or airspeed while flying in
simulators or simulated instrument conditions (Mengelkoch,
Adams, & Gainer, 1971; Casner, Geven, Recker, & Schooler,
2014).
Another study investigated military pilot instrument skills
via survey methodology (Wright, 1973). One general aviation
(GA) study conducted by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) looked broadly at weather-related GA accidents
and risk factors but did not examine pilot instrument currency
data or pilot proficiency (NTSB, 2005). Another NTSB study
researched glass cockpit GA safety and IMC operations but did
not collect or analyze pilot currency or training (NTSB, 2010).
While each study cited here provides insight into some of the
issues of GA instrument flying skill and proficiency, none
focused on the relationships between instrument flying skills,
currency, proficiency, and loss of control accidents involving
GA pilots while flying in IMC. This is in part due to the
nature of the studies themselves. Many of the studies were
experimental lab studies, some involving nonpilots trained to
operate early simulators, while other studies utilized survey
data. Most research focused on airline pilots instead of GA
pilots. Finally, research is hindered by the lack of data as most
NTSB investigations do not exhaustively collect data on Part 91
GA pilot flying history as they do in Part 121 accident
investigations.
Instrument Skill Erosion
Mengelkoch, Adams, and Gainer (1971) studied instrument flying skill erosion using 26 undergraduate nonpilot
subjects trained to operate a Link instrument flight trainer.
Subjects were divided into two groups that were given
training that enabled them to ‘‘fly’’ the Link. After the initial
training in which one group received ten training trials and
the other group received five training trials, the subjects took
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a four-month break from training and then retested. The
subjects’ procedures and instrument parameters were measured and t-tests of the results were performed. The authors
concluded that, ‘‘The most important implication for
operational flight training is that procedural responses show
retention losses that are not only statistically but practically
(operationally) significant whereas measures of proficiency
for flight parameters are operationally insignificant’’
(Mengelkoch, Adams, & Gainer, 1971, p. 405). While the
study is instructive on the influence of inactivity and
instrument flying procedures and proficiency, it does not
examine the connection to loss of control in IMC.
Childs, Spears, and Prophet (1983) studied low time
private pilot skill retention over a twenty-four-month period.
Their research linked GA accidents to flying inactivity and
skill degradation; however, they did not examine instrument
skill proficiency. Their research concluded that the degradation of pilot flying skills contributed to a number of pilot error
accidents. Investigators determined that many of these
accidents were due to the lack of flying experience by pilots
in the months before the mishap and the lack of recent
experience in relation to the specific tasks associated with the
mishap. According to the study, ‘‘the specific relation between
loss of flying skills and time is determined by several factors.
Such factors include, for example, the type of task that is
being performed, the original level of the pilot’s skill
acquisition, the duration of the time period since the pilot
received initial training on the task, and the amount and type
of flying done in the interim period since the skill was
learned’’ (Childs, Spears, & Prophet, 1983, p. 4). Their
findings are consistent with Mengelkoch’s research.
Mitchell, Vermeulen, and Naidoo (2009) focused on
airline crews and analyzed commentaries from three surveys
of pilot opinions regarding the introduction of glass cockpit
technology. The authors surveyed airline pilots regarding
their experiences in automated glass cockpit aircraft. It was
found that the population’s attitude was favorable toward
automated cockpits, but there was a concern that automation
would mask a loss of situational awareness among less
experienced pilots.
The authors’ research focused on the loss of pilot skill
attributed to the automated flight deck. Unlike other efforts to
quantify erosion of skills due to an absence from flying,
Mitchell examined a loss of skill while flying. In other words,
they found cockpit inactivity due to automation degraded
instrument flying skills. Professional pilots acknowledged the
loss of flying skills due to a decrease in hand-flying activities.
Their survey comments are below:

N ‘‘Pilots can loose [sic] the basic flying skills required
N
N
N
N

due to lack of ‘hands on’ actual flying.’’
‘‘One loses flying skills.’’
‘‘I miss the flying!! But realize this is the way to go.’’
‘‘But manual flying skills deteriorate over time.’’
‘‘Over automated which is, and will continue to
degrade the pilots handling skill over time!’’
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According to Mitchell, Vermeulen, and Naidoo (2009,
p. 22), ‘‘Automation does degrade flying skills to a level
lower than most professional pilots would like their own
level to be.’’ The authors’ research is important with respect
to automated cockpits and skill erosion and could be a
factor in GA instrument flying with increased automation
in GA aircraft.
Casner, Geven, Recker, and Schooler’s (2014) quantitative
research examined 16 B-747-400 pilots using a level D
B-747 simulator. The pilots were instructed to fly approaches
at a nonfamiliar airport and their performance was measured.
The authors measured pilot flight path deviations while they
were flying using automated flight systems to control the
aircraft, as well as deviations during hand flown segments.
The research discovered difficulties among aircrew using
VOR navigation instrumentation instead of moving map
displays. The research also noted difficulties dealing with
three types of instrumentation failure (airspeed, altimeter, and
heading indicator). Although most pilots verbalized recognition of the failure, many of the pilots could not effectively
handle the aircraft with the instrument failure to within
acceptable tolerances. The authors noted problems with pilot
cognitive skills while the pilots were coping with instrument
failures and found that pilots who stayed mentally engaged
with automation performed better than ones who did not.
‘‘Task unrelated thought’’ accounted for nearly 30% of the
variability in performance (Casner, Geven, Recker, &
Schooler, 2014, p. 30).
The NTSB studied glass cockpit avionics and its effects on
GA safety (NTSB, 2010). The NTSB used manufacturer
records, accident data, and survey data in order to analyze the
impact of modern avionics on GA safety. They defined
‘‘glass cockpit’’ as one with at least one primary flight display
(PFD) (NTSB, 2010). Today most new aircraft are shipped
with PFD/MFD technology and many new aircraft include
sophisticated autopilot systems. The NTSB (2010) hypothesized that the introduction of glass cockpit technology in the
early 2000s would have a positive impact on GA safety. The
NTSB compared aircraft that had both glass and nonglass
versions. The report concluded that, while overall ‘‘glass
cockpit’’ aircraft accident rates were slightly lower, fatal
accident rates were higher. They also noted that glass cockpit
aircraft had a higher incidence of IMC accidents that they
concluded was marginally significant. They addressed the
need for better pilot training and more research to assess
avionics reliability. The NTSB reiterated its recommendation
from a 1992 special study of PA-46 accidents, recommending
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amend 14 CFR
61.31(f) requiring pilots to receive specific training on flight
guidance and control systems (NTSB, 2010).
As part of their research, the NTSB (2010) included several
case studies. Among them was the case study that is the subject
of this paper’s research. While the NTSB correctly opined that
the PA-46 lost air data due to pitot icing and the pilot
subsequently lost control of the aircraft, the Board did not

address any pilot actions with respect to training, currency, or
checklist usage. In fact, the Board did not address any pilot
currency or proficiency issues in their report.
Wright (1973) examined both visual and instrument
flying skill erosion in a group of Army pilots. The purpose
of the study was to examine cost-effective training
methodologies relative to maintaining minimal flying
proficiency versus retraining after a significant lapse in
flying. Wright surveyed Army aviators who had long
periods of nonflying activity or minimal proficiency flying.
Wright’s survey quantified various flight skills relative to
flying versus nonflying activity periods.
Wright noted that inactivity more adversely affected
instrument flight rules skills than visual flight rules (VFR)
skills where most pilots self-reported less than adequate
IFR skills after eight months of inactivity. These results are
consistent with Mengelkoch et al.’s (1971) objective study
measuring a decline in pilot performance with a period of
inactivity from instrument flying. Wright reported almost
all skill erosion occurred in 12 months. Comparably, selfreported VFR skills remained above ‘‘adequate’’ for 36
months. Wright (1973) concluded that all standard instrument-rated Army pilots require refresher instrument training every six months. He further concluded that it would be
‘‘most profitable to devote all proficiency flying (or the
great majority of it) to instrument flying’’ (p. 16).
Wright’s methodology also included survey questions
giving the aviators an opportunity to subjectively rate their
own flying abilities. Wright noted that ‘‘a number of
respondents rated their initial flying ability quite high. Most
of these pilots would appear to either have an inflated
opinion of their flying ability…’’ (Wright, 1973, p. 7).
Over-rating One’s Abilities
‘‘Over-rating’’ one’s abilities is examined in research
where persons with low levels of experience have inflated
opinions of their own abilities (Dunning & Kruger, 1999).
Dunning addressed the relationship between overconfidence and incompetence. The study stated, ‘‘[n]ot only do
these people reach erroneous conclusions and make
unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of
the metacognitive ability to realize it’’ (Dunning & Kruger,
1999, p. 1121).
Pavel, Robertson and Harrison’s research (2012) indicates the presence of the Dunning-Kruger effect in the GA
pilot population. The authors conducted a two phase study
of Southern Illinois University-Carbondale aviation students. In Part Two of the study, students were asked to rate
their performance before the FAA knowledge test was
given. Knowledge test results were obtained from the FAA
and compared to student ranking surveys. The aviation
students who scored in the bottom quartile of the tests
overrated their performance on the FAA exam. Top
performing students underrated their predicted scores,
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while the middle quartiles ranked themselves ‘‘fairly
accurately’’ (Pavel, Robertson, & Harrison, 2012, p. 128).
The authors opined that, ‘‘when facing a new and
potentially dangerous situation, self-confidence is key but
over confidence can be catastrophic’’ (Pavel, Robertson, &
Harrison, 2012, p. 128).
Risk Factors in Weather-Related GA Accidents
Knecht and Lenz’s ‘‘Causes of General Aviation
Weather-Related, Non-Fatal Incidents: Analysis Using
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System Data’’ (2010)
study is a qualitative and quantitative mixed-methods
research approach to discovering causes of aircraft
accidents using incident data. The authors used ‘‘data
mining’’ techniques to examine one hundred pilot selfreported incident records maintained by NASA. In
addition, the authors contacted the incident pilots via
NASA ASRS analysts and collected more data and
narrative statements not contained in initial reports.
Knecht and Lenz (2010, p. 4) attempted ‘‘to identify
what kinds of things go wrong when weather enters the
picture, to whom those things seem to be happening, how
those factors relate to one another and what, if anything,
might be done to reduce future risk.’’ They identified ten
areas that were problems for pilots, including environmental factors such as weather, dusk, and darkness. Other
problem areas for pilots include briefing, forecasting, pilot
training, experience, and decision making.
Knecht and Lenz (2010) also divided their study into
three levels of pilot certification: ATP-rated pilots, non-ATP
instrument-rated pilots, and noninstrument-rated pilots.
Their study revealed significant differences in how each
group operated with respect to weather. The authors reported
that the median pilot in their study had very little experience
(heavily weighted toward noninstrument-rated or low time
instrument-rated pilots) flying in adverse weather conditions
(42–48 hours actual instrument experience and two
approaches in the prior 90 days). In summary, the authors
concluded that newly-minted instrument pilots are at the
greatest risk of incurring a weather-related incident.
In 2005, the NTSB examined GA weather-related
accidents. They utilized a case control methodology comparing 72 accident cases to 135 nonaccident pilots who were
flying in the same area at the same time as the accident flights.
The Board directed their field investigators to collect certain
data about the pilots for later analysis. They surveyed the
nonaccident pilots. Their quantitative analysis of the resulting
data examined pilot age, flying experience, age at first
certificate, prior accident and incident history, violation
history, practical and knowledge test pass rate history, total
flight hours, flight leg length, and aircraft ownership.
Remarkably, the NTSB did not determine the pilots’ last
instrument proficiency check or instrument currency status for
either group.
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Checklist and Procedural Compliance
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, 1995)
published a research report titled, ‘‘Human Performance
Considerations in the Use and Design of Aircraft Checklists’’.
The report was intended to assist operators in designing,
developing, and using aircraft checklists, as well as to
‘‘increase awareness of the impact of human performance as
it relates to the use of checklists’’ (p. 1). The literature
addressed an NTSB safety study of 37 major accidents of
U.S. air carriers between 1978 and 1990. The NTSB study
found that in 60% of the accidents analyzed, procedural
errors such as ‘‘uninitiated or inadequately performed
checklists’’ (p. 3) were classified as causal to the accidents.
Further review by the NTSB revealed ‘‘that during the period
1983 to 1993, approximately 279 aircraft accidents occurred
where the checklist was not used or followed during Part 91,
121, and 135 operations’’ (p. 3).
Pilot Training, Pilot Proficiency, and Accidents
Fanjoy and Keller’s (2013) ‘‘Flight Skill Proficiency
Issues in Instrument Approach Accidents’’ examined 170
aircraft accident reports that occurred while on an
instrument approach with respect to completion of an
instrument proficiency check (IPC). Fanjoy and Keller
conducted a quantitative study of aircraft accidents that
occurred during the approach phase of flight between 2002
and 2012. Half of the surveyed accidents occurred within
three and one half months of the last IPC. They stated that a
‘‘leading cause of these accidents was a loss of control’’ (p.
17). Fanjoy and Keller’s analysis indicates that these
accidents, including loss of control accidents, occurred
when the pilots were still instrument ‘‘current’’ and
presumably ‘‘proficient’’.
Fanjoy and Keller (2013) sought to ‘‘examine general
aviation accidents during instrument approach and identify
common themes as well as any correlation between the
interval between such accidents after initial or recurring IPC’’
(p. 20). They examined ten years of accident data and
identified IPC dates prior to the accident. Of the 170
accidents, they found 31 (18%) with identified IPC dates.
Their research data showed that the mean number of days
since an IPC was conducted was 125 days and the median
was 111 days. This analysis is noteworthy; however, there is
the possibility that many accident pilots had no current IPC
logged or the possibility that the IPC was granted
fraudulently. There is no analysis of individual pilot logbooks
to ascertain pilot instrument experience. A qualitative study
complementing Fanjoy and Keller’s research would examine
the details of GA pilot training and proficiency with respect
to temporal passage and skill erosion shedding more light on
the issues of currency and proficiency.
Several factors emerge from the literature review: pilot
overconfidence in their own flying abilities, poor checklist
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usage and procedural compliance, atrophy of manual
instrument flying skills due to autopilot use, and erosion
of instrument hand-flying skills due to the passage of time.
While these studies identify pilot currency issues related to
flying skills, the studies do not conclude that unsafe
conditions arise when these conditions are present. They do
not reveal in a fine grained manner ‘‘why’’ GA loss of
control accidents happen in IMC conditions. The purpose
of this case study is to correlate themes from the literature
relative to this accident case study and to explore new
factors that may not be identified in other research
literature.
Methodology
This research utilizes an exploratory single case study
approach. The exploratory case study’s purpose is to find
undiscovered or unknown themes or factors that may be
involved in GA loss of control accidents. These new
themes or factors can then be tested in future research.
This exploratory case study uses multiple data sources
including ATC audio transcripts, aircraft flight data (NTSB,
n.d.a), pilot logbook (Pilot, n.d.), training and FAA
certificate records (FAA, 2009), NTSB and FAA accident
reports (NTSB, 2009b), numerous physical wreckage
inspections, and witness interviews and deposition testimony to define certain events and explore why the accident
occurred. The author was a consulting aircraft accident
investigator.
Multiple sources of information were triangulated with
respect to the accident. The triangulation of information
provides for a ‘‘convergence of data collected from
different sources, to determine the consistency of a
finding’’ (Yin, 2014, p. 241). The digital data from the
aircraft primary flight display and multifunction display
(MFD) was analyzed with respect to aircraft and pilot
operations and compared to exemplar test aircraft results
and pilot operating handbook requirements. The pilot
logbook was compared to the pilot’s FAA certificate
documents, SimCom training forms, and statements made
by the accident pilot’s flight instructors to determine the
pilot’s experience level.
This case study is bounded by the events leading up to
the accident, notably the pilot’s training and flying history,
the events of the accident day, and related post-accident
documentation detailing the accident itself. The following
information presented is from official government sources
and nonprivileged discovery provided in the litigation
connected to this accident. The major themes or factors
related to the case included poor procedural or checklist
usage, weak pilot proficiency and autopilot usage, improper
pilot training, pilot logbook and record irregularities, and
poor aircraft systems knowledge. Two themes not found in
the literature include improper pilot training and pilot
logbook/record irregularities.

Findings
On Thursday, June 28, 2007, at 08:15 Central Daylight
Time (1315 UTC), a Piper PA-46-500TP Meridian, call sign
N477MD, broke up in-flight and then impacted terrain west
of St. Louis, Missouri. A line of fast moving convective
activity, with heavy rain and instrument meteorological
conditions aloft, existed at the time of the accident. An IFR
flight plan was filed and activated for the accident flight. The
private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The
aircraft was destroyed. The flight was a return leg on a
business trip for the owner and his two employees, who were
in St. Louis for an ethanol convention (NTSB, 2009a).
Aircraft accident reconstruction of events indicates the pilot
lost control of the aircraft shortly after the autopilot
disconnected while flying in instrument meteorological
conditions (NTSB, n.d.b).
One hour before the accident, the pilot called an
Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) to file an IFR
flight plan and obtain an abbreviated weather update. During
the briefing, the briefer informed the pilot of heavy rain and
thunderstorm activity in Missouri along the intended route of
flight. The pilot told the briefer that he had onboard radar for
weather avoidance (NTSB, 2009a).
The aircraft departed into a line of convective weather
just a few miles from the airport. A review of the audio
recording of the Gateway TRACON facility, radar, and
digital aircraft data revealed the following sequence of
events. After takeoff, the pilot immediately deviated north,
then west, and flew into an area of heavy precipitation
while climbing out of the Spirit of St. Louis (KSUS)
airport. The aircraft data and flight path information is
consistent with a constant airspeed autopilot climb. The
pilot continued his climb on autopilot, through precipitation, but was still below the tops of the cumulus. The
aircraft climbed through the freezing level at 13:09:36 UTC
at a pressure altitude of 15,831 feet (NTSB, n.d.b). The
airspeed indication on the pilot’s primary flight display
began to decrease 57 seconds after climbing through the
freezing level (NTSB, 2009a). This is consistent with icing
of the twin pitot tubes blocking the ram air pressure.
Checklist and Procedural Compliance
While at the hold short line, the pilot is responsible for
ensuring the Before Takeoff checklist is complete. ‘‘Pitot
Heat -On’’ is part of that checklist. There is no evidence on
the multifunction display (MFD) data analyzed after the
accident flight that the pilot selected pitot heat at any time
during the flight (NTSB, n.d.a). The amperage does not
indicate a rise in amperage consistent with pitot heat
selection. The MFD in the accident aircraft recorded 4
minutes and 48 seconds of data from the time the pilot
began to taxi the aircraft until he added power on the
takeoff roll. This data shows that the pilot stopped at the
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hold short line for less than 60 seconds prior to his takeoff
roll. The MFD data from the accident aircraft indicates an
increase in engine power but no check of the pitot heat or
other systems was performed. According to Piper’s Flight
Test Department, a 13 amp rise is observed when the pitot
heat is selected ON during cruise conditions (NTSB, 2009a).
The Engine Run Up checklist procedure calls for the
generator and alternator to each be selected OFF and then
back ON while checking for the appropriate change in
annunciator lights and electrical system load indicated on
the MFD (Piper, 2005). The generator and alternator checks
would be indicated in the alternator and generator load
information recorded in the MFD data. These checks were
not indicated in the recorded data post-accident (NTSB,
2009a). Data from prior flights were checked with similar
results, indicating the pilot did not routinely perform
pretakeoff checklists and turn on pitot heat. This is
consistent with poor checklist usage habits by the pilot.
There is no evidence from the downloaded aircraft MFD or
PFD data that the pilot, upon entering icing conditions,
activated the pitot heat, prop heat, or windshield heat
according to the Piper checklist for flight into known icing
conditions (NTSB, 2009a; NTSB, n.d.b).
Checklists assist pilots in ensuring that the aircraft and its
systems are configured correctly for each phase of flight, as
well as verifying that all systems are working properly. The
accident pilot failed to follow the provided aircraft
checklists and omitted crucial steps in the various stages
prior to takeoff and after takeoff. Examination of PFD and
MFD data from the accident aircraft showed the pilot had a
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habit of noncompliance with checklist usage on prior
flights, as well (NTSB, n.d.b).
Pilot Proficiency and Autopilot Usage
The aircraft data indicates the autopilot was engaged
shortly after takeoff. The autopilot remained on until the
pilot disengaged or overpowered it shortly before the
airspeed data was lost. The pilot’s airspeed indicated zero
on the PFD at 13:10:45 UTC, one minute and 9 seconds
after climbing through the freezing level. Similarly, the
copilot’s airspeed began decreasing and indicated zero at
approximately 13:10:51 UTC. The autopilot began to pitch
the aircraft nose down in an attempt to maintain airspeed
when the airspeed began to decrease, since it was engaged
in airspeed climb mode (NTSB, 2009a; NTSB, n.d.b).
According to S-Tec, the autopilot manufacturer, the
autopilot will disconnect if the g loading exceeds +/20.6
g’s from normal flight or if the pitch rate exceeds 4 degrees
per second (S-Tec, 2004). These limitations were not
exceeded until after the direction of the pitch reversed and
began to increase at 13:10:43.8 UTC (NTSB, 2009b). The
reversal from decreasing to increasing pitch was a result of
the accident pilot pulling back on the yoke.
The aircraft digital recorded data downloaded from the
Avidyne PFD and MFD shows that the aircraft was unstable
due to pilot mishandling of the controls for approximately two
minutes prior to the breakup. During that time, the pilot first
pitched the aircraft up to a maximum pitch angle of 35 degrees
above the horizon (the aircraft then stalled), and then pitched

Figure 1. Altitude, airspeed, and outside air temperature—PFD1, MFD.
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Figure 2. Altitude, pitch, and roll.

Figure 3. Vertical acceleration.

W. J. Edwards / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering

27

Figure 4. Piper PA-46-500TP cockpit.

down to a minimum pitch angle of 230 degrees, at which
point the nose came up briefly but quickly dropped to 287
degrees (nearly straight down). The aircraft roll angles during
those two minutes varied from 42 degrees left wing down to 20
degrees right wing down. Right roll increased rapidly immediately prior to the breakup (NTSB, n.d.b; NTSB, 2009b).
The pitch excursions were accompanied by over five
positive and negative ‘‘g’’ excursions that exceeded the
aircraft limitations causing the wing spar failures (NTSB,
2009a). The loss of control began immediately after the
autopilot disconnect.
The in-flight breakup was preceded by a time span of
two minutes in which the pilot did not maintain a normal
flight attitude by reference to the three working and
independent attitude indicators in the cockpit (NTSB, n.d.b;
Piper, 2005). The pilot was unable to hand-fly the aircraft
in IMC. He overcontrolled the aircraft in pitch and roll.
This resulted in overstressing the wings, which caused
them to fail (NTSB, 2009b).
Pilot Training
The pilot was a successful businessman and got into GA
later in life, owning a succession of high performance
single engine aircraft. His pilot history was reconstructed
from Federal Aviation Administration records on file at the
FAA record center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, including

his FAA airman medical records and certificate records.
Other records used to reconstruct the pilot history included
various training records and flight time recorded with three
flight instructors (NTSB, n.d.b). Several of these people
were deposed for litigation. The pilot’s logbook was also
used to reconstruct his flying history (Pilot, n.d.).
The accident pilot was issued his private pilot airplane
single-engine land certificate on November 9, 1999, at the
age of 37. He applied for an FAA instrument rating on
March 25, 2005; however, he failed the check ride. He was
immediately given remedial training and subsequently
retested and passed (FAA, 2009).
The story the logbook portrays is of a pilot who did not
regard instrument currency seriously. He logged five
instrument approaches on May 24 and 26, 2005, in
connection with his new PA-32 purchase and completion
of his instrument rating. He then logged one instrument
approach on June 9, 2005, and one on July 11, 2005. The
pilot logged 1.1 hours of actual instrument time on July 11,
2005. There is no record of ‘‘holding’’ in his logbook after
March 23, 2005. There is no record in the logbook of
‘‘intercepting’’ or ‘‘tracking courses’’—tasks necessary to
log for instrument currency. The pilot’s instrument currency
expired on September 30, 2005—six months after completing his instrument rating (Pilot, n.d.).
The accident pilot continued to frequently fly out of
instrument currency. He logged an instrument approach
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Figure 5. Avidyne PFD—invalid air data (Avidyne Entegra EXP5000 PFD Pilot’s Guide, p. 40).

on February 29, March 14, and March 20, 2006, while he
was not instrument current. The pilot logged no actual or
simulated instrument time during these three approaches.
He was either unaware of instrument logging requirements or chose to ignore those requirements. For
example, there is no indication in his logbook of a safety
pilot onboard the aircraft—required for simulated instrument flight. The pilot did not record the type of
instrument approach on any of the approaches flown
between May 2005 and March 2006 (Pilot, n.d.). A pilot
is required to record the location and type of instrument
approach if the approach is to be used to meet instrument
experience requirements.

After purchasing the new Piper Meridian in August
2006, the pilot completed a flight training course in the
Piper Meridian on August 30, 2006, with an independent
contract flight instructor. The flight instructor endorsed him
for an IPC on the first day of training in an aircraft the pilot
just purchased. They completed just one simulated
approach and 0.5 hour of simulated instrument flight time
(Pilot, n.d.). This does not meet standards for an instrument
proficiency check (IPC) and likely contributed to the
accident. Another accident investigation revealed the same
instructor gave a similar IPC endorsement to another low
time instrument pilot that also resulted in a fatal accident,
shortly after the endorsement (NTSB, n.d.a).

Figure 6. Piper PA-46-500TP cockpit.
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Pilot Logbook Irregularities
14 CFR 61.57 requires that a pilot must perform and log
six approaches, holding and radial tracking in the preceding
six months or receive an instrument proficiency check from
a Certified Flight Instructor—Instrument (CFII) in order to
act as Pilot in Command (PIC) under instrument flight
rules. In addition, 14 CFR 61.51 details how a pilot should
log flight time and 14 CFR 61.59 outlines fraudulent
logbook entries (U. S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
The accident pilot was not legally instrument ‘‘current’’ at
the time of the accident.
The pilot attended SimCom training for the Piper
Meridian in November 2006, less than 90 days after his
training with the instructor (NTSB, n.d.b). The pilot
reported on his SimCom pilot history form that he had
over 1,000 total flight hours and ‘‘300+’’ hours of
instrument time (NTSB, 2009a), when he actually had far
fewer hours logged (NTSB, n.d.b). He did not receive an
endorsement from SimCom for an instrument proficiency
check or a flight review, even though he requested these
endorsements be included in his training (NTSB, 2009b).
This lack of endorsement by SimCom is consistent with the
pilot’s failure to successfully meet IPC and flight review
standards. When flight instructors withhold requested
endorsements in training, it is usually because the pilot
cannot meet standards. There was no further training
recorded in 2007 prior to the accident (Pilot, n.d.).
The accident pilot demonstrated, via his logbook, a lack
of understanding regarding how to properly log instrument
flight time and how to maintain instrument currency. He
also demonstrated a willingness to fly IFR while not
instrument current. The pilot’s last logbook entry was
November 23, 2006—seven months prior to the accident.
His last logged instrument approach was August 30,
2006—ten months prior to the accident (Pilot, n.d.).
A young CFI, who did initial operating experience flying
in the PA-46 accident airplane with the accident pilot,
described the pilot as a confident pilot (Larson, 2008). The
downloaded aircraft data from the accident flight shows the
pilot was incompetent in flying the PA-46-500TP in
instrument conditions (NTSB, n.d.b).
The pilot’s last pilot logbook total hour entry indicated
he had 248 pilot hours as of May 26, 2005 (Pilot, n.d.). In
addition to the logbook, FlightAware data was acquired for
the accident aircraft (FlightAware, n.d.). The timeframe
spanned June 5, 2005 to June 28, 2007. The FlightAware
data, logbooks, and flight data from flights with the young
CFI were analyzed to determine the accident pilot’s time in
type as well as his total flight hours. The analysis indicated
that the accident pilot had approximately 667 total flight
hours at the time of the accident. The pilot’s total time in the
PA-46-500TP was approximately 151 hours (Pilot, n.d,;
FlightAware, n.d.). All of his time in type was accumulated
in the accident aircraft and is consistent with the aircraft
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records (NTSB, n.d.b). At the completion of training with
the independent instructor in August 2006, the accident pilot
had approximately 485 hours (Pilot, n.d.; FlightAware, n.d.).
Upon completion of his training at SimCom in November
2006, he had approximately 542 total hours—not the 1,000
plus hours he claimed on his SimCom pilot history form
(Pilot, n,d,; NTSB, 2009a; FlightAware, n.d.). He logged a
total of 2.7 hours of logged actual instrument time after
completing his instrument rating in March 2005. At the time
of the accident, the pilot had a total of 2.4 hours of logged
actual instrument time where he was the only pilot on board.
The pilot logbook indicates a total of 10.4 hours of actual
instrument time and 31.2 hours of simulated instrument time
as of November 2006 (almost all of it acquired in pursuit of
his instrument rating)—not the ‘‘300+’’ hours of instrument
time he listed on his SimCom pilot history form (Pilot, n.d.;
NTSB, 2009a). Thirty percent of a pilot’s total flight time
logged as actual instrument time is an extraordinary amount
of instrument time, and was also likely fraudulently stated on
his SimCom registration form. This is likely why SimCom
did not endorse the pilot for a flight review and IPC in the
Meridian (SimCom, 2006).
The accident pilot was a very inexperienced instrument
pilot flying a high performance aircraft. He likely falsely
claimed more flight time and experience than he actually
had in order to satisfy insurance requirements, since most
insurance underwriters would require a pilot have at least
1,000 hours total time in order to be insured in a Piper
Meridian.
Aircraft Systems Knowledge
The Instrument Flying Handbook (FAA, 2001) outlines
pilot techniques for flying instruments. These techniques
depend on the pilot properly interpreting the aircraft
instruments and making proper flight control inputs. The
Piper Meridian had two PFDs—one on each pilot side with a
large MFD in the center. These PFDs presented airspeed,
altitude, rate of climb, attitude, heading, and turn rate, as well
as other information, to the pilot. The Meridian also had a set
of mechanical standby gauges in a vertical row adjacent to
the pilot’s PFD (Piper, 2005). The standby gauges give a
pilot the means to also fly the aircraft safely under instrument
conditions. According to the FAA Instrument Rating
Practical Test Standards, pilots are required to demonstrate
‘‘basic instrument flight maneuvers under both full-panel
and references to backup primary flight instruments/electronic flight instrument displays’’ on the instrument rating test
and during subsequent IPCs (FAA, 2004, p. 14). The FAA
expects pilots to maintain these partial panel instrument
skills during their instrument flying career.
In this case, the Piper Meridian is classified as a
technically-advanced aircraft and has backup flight instruments in front of the pilot. The pilot did not suffer a total
loss of basic flight instruments or his PFD when he
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overcontrolled the aircraft. He initially lost airspeed, and
then his air data instruments ‘‘flagged’’ on the PFDs (NTSB,
n.d.b). He continued to have functioning pilot and copilot
PFD attitude and heading instruments, and also a mechanical
backup attitude indicator and altimeter that were not affected
by the loss of the pitot system (NTSB, 2009a). GPS
groundspeed was also presented on the PFD. The loss of
airspeed indication was attributed to the pilot’s failure to
engage the deice and anti-ice systems on the aircraft.
Knowledge and application of these systems could have
averted the accident.
Discussion and Conclusions
Was the erosion of the accident pilot’s instrument handflying skill present in this case? The training records
indicate the pilot did not possess adequate instrument skills.
The aircraft data shows that the pilot lost control as soon as
the autopilot turned off. Although some data was lost on
the PFD, backup information on the PFD and standby
instruments provided all the necessary flight information
(airspeed and altitude) that was lost.
Did the accident pilot possess an inflated opinion of his
flying skills? Documents with inflated flight times and
flight instructor testimony indicate the pilot was overly
confident in his abilities—in spite of failing an instrument
checkride and not obtaining endorsement for an IPC during
his latest training event.
This case study explores the themes or factors present in
this accident. Two of these factors are not discussed in
other research.
1. The pilot did not follow sound checklist procedures.
The MFD and PFD data indicate the pilot frequently
did not follow proper checklist procedures for flying
the Piper PA-46 on the accident day. The pilot not
only did not activate pitot heat in icing conditions,
but he did not activate any anti-ice or deice systems.
This is consistent with FAA research on checklist use
and may be a larger problem in GA. This warrants
future research to discover the extent of checklist
misuse by GA pilots.
2. The autopilot disconnect and the immediate loss of
control exhibited was recorded by accident aircraft
PFD and MFD data. The pilot immediately pitched
the aircraft to plus 35 degrees aircraft nose up. The
degradation of the pilot’s cognitive and instrument
hand-flying skills were likely due to his low total
recorded instrument flying experience and his overuse and overreliance on the autopilot following his
May 2005 instrument rating check ride. This is
consistent with Casner, Geven, Recker, and Schooler’s
(2014) findings. The investigation of this accident
revealed that the pilot was not sufficiently proficient to
hand-fly IMC and this phenomena may be more
prevalent in GA. This also merits further research.

3. The pilot’s initial instrument training in the PA-46
was not performed to standards. He was endorsed for
an IPC on his first training flight in the PA-46,
logging only one half hour of simulated instrument
time. He did not receive an endorsement for an IPC
on his subsequent training episode, again suggesting
that he lacked instrument proficiency.
4. The pilot likely was overconfident in his flying skills.
One instructor described him as very confident pilot.
On the accident flight he departed into a line of
severe weather that could be seen from the ramp and
was offered a deviation around the weather by ATC,
but he chose to go through it.
5. The pilot’s aviation records indicate a pattern of
inflated flight times and experience not consistent
with his own logbook. This also suggests he had an
inflated sense of his own flying abilities. His logbook
was incomplete, and, on face value, indicates the
pilot had limited actual instrument experience and
was not instrument current at the time of the accident.
6. Finally, the pilot’s poor application of aircraft
systems knowledge is also evident in the data.
Turning on pitot heat could have averted this
accident. The yellow pitot heat warning lights on
the caution and warning panel were illuminated the
entire flight, indicating to the pilot that pitot heat was
not activated. Additionally, his habit of not using the
anti-ice and deice systems as required by the AFM
indicate weakness in his systems knowledge.
As in any study of an aircraft accident, it is usually not
one item that leads to an accident, but rather a chain of
events that cause an accident. Future research is needed to
understand the importance and interrelationship among
these factors in other GA instrument-related loss of control
accidents. The relationship between instrument flying
experience and autopilot usage patterns in GA, for
example, needs to be explored further, as one could
conceivably have a significant amount of instrument
experience, but very little actual ‘‘hands-on’’ time. Such
research may lead to regulatory changes regarding instrument ‘‘currency’’ requirements; for example, requiring
mandatory IPCs every six months instead of logging
instrument experience. Also, single pilot GA checklist
usage and systems knowledge requires further research in
order to determine the true state of GA pilot knowledge and
practice and its impact on GA safety.
References
Avidyne Corporation. (2007, October 1). Entegra Piper Meridian
EXP5000 primary flight display pilot’s guide. Rev. 4. Lincoln, MA.
Baxter, S., & Jack, P. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study
design and implementation for novice researchers. The Qualitative
Report, 544–559.
Casner, S. M., Geven, R. W., Recker, M. P., & Schooler, J. W. (2014, May
16). The retention of manual flying skills in the automated cockpit.

W. J. Edwards / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering
Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society. doi: 10.1177/001872081453628
Childs, J. M., Spears, W., & Prophet, W. (1983). Private pilot skill
retention in 8, 16 and 24 months following certification. Pensacola, FL:
National Technical Information Service.
Dunning, D., & Kruger, J. (1999, June). Unskilled and unaware of it: How
difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated
self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
1121–1134.
FAA. (1995). Human performance considerations in the use and design of
aircraft checklists. Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration.
FAA. (2001). The instrument flying handbook. Washington, D.C.: Federal
Aviation Administration.
FAA. (2004). Instrument rating practical test for airplane helicopter
powered lift. Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration.
FAA. (2009). FAA airman file pertaining to David Lee McCormick.
Oklahoma City, OK: Federal Aviation Administration.
Fanjoy, R. O., & Keller, J. C. (2013). Flight skill proficiency issues in
instrument approach accidents. Journal of Aviation Technology and
Engineering, 3(1), 17–23.
FlightAware. (n.d.). FlightAware data for N477MD.
General Aviation Joint Steering Committee. (2012). General Aviation
Joint Steering Committee Loss of Control Work Group Approach
and Landing. Washington, D.C.: General Aviation Joint Steering
Committee (GA JSC).
Knecht, M., & Lenz, W. R. (2010). Causes of general aviation weatherrelated, non-fatal incidents: Analysis using NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System data. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Federal Aviation
Administration.
Larson, K. (2008, September 18). Deposition of Matthew Ketcham.
Minneapolis, MN.
Maxwell, J. A. (2009). A realist approach for qualitative research. Los
Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
Mengelkoch, R. F., Adams, J. A., & Gainer, A. C. (1971). The forgetting
of instrument flying skills. Human Factors, 13, 397–405.
Mitchell, J., Vermeulen, L. P., & Naidoo, P. (2009). Flying glass: A
qualitative analysis of pilot perceptions of automated flight-decks
after 20 years. International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies,
9(1), 13–28.

31

NTSB. (2005). Risk factors associated with weather-related general
aviation accidents. Washington, D.C.: National Transportation Safety
Board.
NTSB. (2009a). NTSB aviation accident database & synposes. Retrieved
March 2, 2014, from http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?
ev_id520070705X00878&key51
NTSB. (2009b). NTSB factual report aviation CHI07FA183. Washington,
D.C.: NTSB.
NTSB. (2010). Introduction of glass cockpit avionics into light aircraft.
Washington, D.C.: NTSB.
NTSB. (2013, November 23). NTSB accident database. Retrieved
November 23, 2013, from http://dms.ntsb.gov/aviation/AccidentReports/
ssvfyc2mg1q1o1qasozlzy551/R11232013120000.pdf
NTSB. (n.d.a). NTSB: Docket management system/Bradford. Retrieved
March 2, 2014, from http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?
docketID549494&CFID5220040&CFTOKEN512253516
NTSB. (n.d.b). NTSB: Docket management system/McCormick. Retrieved
March 2, 2014, from http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?
docketID544201&CurrentPage51&EndRow515&StartRow51&
order51&sort50&TXTSEARCHT5
Pavel, S. R., Robertson, M. F., & Harrison, B. T. (2012). The DunningKruger Effect and SIUC University’s aviation students. Journal of
Aviation Technology and Engineering, 2(1), 125–129.
Pilot. (n.d.). Pilot logbook.
Piper. (2005, May 6). PA-46-500TP Merdian Pilot’s operating handbook.
Report VB-1912. Vero Beach, FL: Piper.
Prophet, W. W. (1976). Long-term retention of flying skills: An annotated
bibliography. Washington, D.C.: United States Air Force.
SimCom. (2006, November 27). Malibu Meridian simulator proficiency
training record for David McCormick. Vero Beach, FL.
S-Tec. (2004). S-Tec Magic 1500 Autopilot (P/N 01304) Pilot’s Operating
Handbook. Mineral Wells, TX: S-Tec.
U. S. Government Printing Office. (2013, October 20). Electronic Code of
Federal Regulations. Retrieved from http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?c5ecfr &SID 5c 84c b1a6aec41311390130570a84f3f9&
rgn5div8&view5text&node514:2.0.1.1.2.1.1.36&idno514
Wright, R. H. (1973). Retention of flying skills and refresher training
requirements: Effects of non-flying and proficiency flying. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Army.
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case study research (5th ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage
Publishers.

